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Value for Money and Audit Practice in the UK Public Sector 
 
Summary: This paper uses both role theory and audit expectations gap theory to critically 
evaluate the ability of Value for Money (VfM) audit procedures to improve performance in 
UK public sector organisations. The paper reports on an empirical study of seventeen auditors 
and twenty two representatives of VfM client organisations. Specifically, the study has the 
following objectives;  
 to examine auditors‟ and clients‟ expectations and perceptions about the ability of the 
VfM audit to improve public sector organisations‟ performance;  
 to examine, from both auditors‟ and clients‟ perspectives, the impact of the interplay 
of personal (the VfM auditors‟ competence relevance of skills, experience and 
knowledge of the public bodies‟ activities), interpersonal (task interdependence 
between the external VfM auditors and the clients) and external factors (the ambiguity 
of the VfM audit process) on the VfM audit performance; and  
 to identify the nature of potential role conflicts in the VfM audit environment along 
with the causes and consequences of such potential conflicts. 
The results show that the VfM audit was perceived as an important potential means with 
which to improve institutional performance in the public sector, but had been poorly 
implemented in the audited bodies. While the majority of the VfM auditors interviewed took 
an extremely positive view of their own achievements in terms of improving public 
institutions‟ performances and delivering VfM services, the majority of the clients that we 
interviewed were not convinced of their auditors‟ competence to carry out a VfM audit 
effectively, and to provide them with valuable recommendations.  
Our results show that differences in expectations and perceptions of role between the external 
VfM auditors and the auditees give rise to significant conflict. Three types of role conflict 
have been identified; (a) conflict between the external VfM auditors‟ roles and their own 
professional values and standards (person-role conflict); (b) conflict between the external 
VfM auditors‟ actual capabilities and their role requirements (role overload), and (c) conflict 
between the external VfM auditors and the auditees (inter-sender conflict).  
Finally, the paper suggests that there is a necessity for more studies to examine what makes 
for an effective VfM audit. Research is needed into the different contexts in which VfM 
audits are found and how contextual factors impact on the auditing process, especially in 
view of the pressures for change which characterise public sector context nowadays.    
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Abstract: This paper uses both role theory and audit expectations gap theory to critically 
evaluate the ability of Value for Money (VfM) audit procedures to improve performance in 
UK public sector organisations. Our paper reports on an empirical study of seventeen auditors 
and twenty two representatives of VfM client organisations. The results show that although 
the VfM audit plays a part in enhancing the institutional performance of the public sector, 
much of the audit‟s practices have not been institutionalised in the audited bodies as had 
previously been assumed. Questions were raised about the relevance of the auditors‟ 
experience and knowledge of the audited body‟s activities. Our results also indicate 
significant role conflicts in the VfM process. Three types of conflict could be identified; (a) 
conflict between the VfM auditors‟ roles and their own professional values and standards 
(person-role conflict); (b) conflict between the VfM auditors‟ capabilities and their role 
requirements (role overload), and (c) conflict between the auditors and the auditees (inter-
sender conflict). 
 






The late 1970s heralded dramatic changes in the structure and management of public sector 
organisations in the UK, brought about by the view that they were insufficiently accountable, 
wasteful, and thus not giving value for money (Cooper, 2004; Prowle, 2010). This neo-
conservative ideological view (Cochrane, 1993; Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2008) sought to link 
public agency, efficiency, and accountability through the introduction and adoption of private 
sector management concepts and practices. The consequence was intended to be an increased 
emphasis on cost control, financial transparency, the introduction of quasi-market 
mechanisms in contracts, and the enhancement of accountability to customers for quality of 
service via the creation of performance indicators (Power, 1999; Golembiewski and Kuhnert, 
1994; Ghobadian et al, 2007).   
In parallel, the role of external auditors within the public sector expanded from simply 
auditing the accounts and reporting on the regularity of the public audited bodies to a stronger 
focus on evaluating management performance and commenting on issues such as the 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the use of taxpayers‟ money (Glynn and Murphy, 
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1996). As a result of this change in clients professional scope, in particular those non-
accounting professionals and managers at the operational level, started to have to engage with 
their commenting on auditors‟ work.  
There is growing evidence (Koo and Sim, 1999; Tanko Samuel and Dabo, 2010) that gaps 
can develop between auditors‟ and clients‟ perceptions of the usefulness of the VfM audit  
giving rise to role conflicts (see also Glynn, 1983). It is in this theoretical tradition that the 
present study sits. Specifically, the aim of this study is to examine the ways in which external 
auditors and the auditees (mainly professionals and operational managers), perceive the 
performance of the practices of the Value for Money (VfM) audit in the UK public sector. 
Interviews were undertaken with auditors from the National Audit Office (NAO), the Audit 
Commission (AC), and different accounting firms operating in the private sector, all of which 
undertake VfM audit in public sector organisations. Clients were chosen from different 
organisations within the National Health Service, Local Government Authorities, Police 
Service and Housing Associations. 
The study seeks to make two areas of contribution to knowledge. First, by using qualitative 
research methods and asking questions such as „How‟ and „Why‟, this research provides 
deeper insights into the practice of the VfM audits than has previously been undertaken. New 
insights are presented on the external VfM auditors‟ and their clients‟ expectations of the 
VfM auditors‟ roles, and how both parties perceive the usefulness of the VfM audit in terms 
of improving performance in UK public sector institutions. The research also provides 
explanations about why a gap in expectations or perceptions exists and, consequently, how 
such a gap affects the performance of VfM audit practices. In addition, by adopting a 
qualitative research approach, factors that hinder the performance of the VfM audit practices 
and undermine its impact on the public sector audited institutions are identified. These factors 
range from personal (the VfM auditors‟ competence, relevance of skills, experience and 
knowledge of the public bodies‟ activities), interpersonal (task interdependence between the 
external VfM auditors and the clients) and external factors (the ambiguity of the VfM audit 
process). Second, the research on audit expectations gap has focused on identifying the 
existence of such a gap between the auditors and different users of the financial statements 
concerning the duties and responsibilities that are supposed to be fulfilled by the auditors (see 
for example Koo and Sim 1999; Gibbins, McCracken and Salterio, 2010). However, the same 
literature dismissed the audited organisation‟s perspective. Therefore, this article provides a 
better understanding of the process of the VfM audit, as expected and perceived by the 
external auditors and the auditees (professionals and operational managers). 
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The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section two reviews the literature in the area of 
public sector auditing and VfM audit. Section three critiques the theoretical perspectives used 
in this study. Research methods and design are discussed in section four. The study results 
are presented and evaluated in section five. The last section concludes the paper and outlines 
some recommendations for policymakers and areas for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Before the 1960s VfM audit used to refer to the type of audit which focused on assessing the 
economy and efficiency of government expenditures (Normanton, 1966). Since then, the field 
has expanded; the VFM audit (often used synonymously with performance audit) now refers 
to the assessment of public services in terms of economy, efficiency and effectiveness - the 
“3Es” (Power, 1997; Lapsley, and Pong, 2000; Morin, 2001; Funnel and Wade, 2012).  
The VfM audit could be regarded as a form of „performance auditing‟ (Pollitt et al., 1999, 
cited in Arnaboldi and Lapsley, 2008:20), a notion which most frequently applied to 
European countries (Pollitt, 2003), or it could be more readily understood as a form of 
„comprehensive auditing‟, as defined in North America (Everton, 2003), or it could be 
essentially viewed as providing a best value audit, as has been inferred in the UK (Arnaboldi 
and Lapsley, 2008). 
In contrast to the financial audit Barzelay (1997) argue that the VfM audit is more than a 
neutral monitoring technique. Auditors who are appointed to report on public organisations 
are expected to carry out their work not only to maintain confidence in public sector spending 
but also to add value by reporting on how the organisations might achieve improvement in 
the delivery of public services (Percy, 2001). Bowerman, Raby and Humphery (2000) note 
that the performance audit is an important tool, but is only one of a wide range of 
performance measurement and monitoring vehicles that are being used by public sector 
managers and officials to improve accountability and performance. In Sweden, Grönlund et 
al., (2011) concluded that such audits may help to assess both how the government and/or 
central agencies fulfil their mandates and how the government and its related agencies adhere 
to legislation, rules and policies (right or wrong). The authors observed that in some cases, 
the Swedish National Audit Office equates compliance audit with performance audit. This is 
an indicator of the general complexity of the requirements of such audits and the way that it 
can be interpreted. 
5 
 
Lonsdale (2011) in his outline of the historical development of the VfM audit, from the early 
1980‟s through to 2009, identifies a number of changes in VfM audit methods. In the 1980s 
to 1990s there was widespread use of questionnaires and surveys. Then in the early 2000s 
new methods such as focus groups, case studies, international comparisons and literature 
review began to emerge. Recent research studies have introduced further methods in studying 
VfM audit including site visits, expert panels and focus groups. The context of VfM audit 
itself has apparently been shaped and defined by the changes in the environment in terms of 
administrative challenges, intellectual and technological developments. Twenty six of the 
methods Lonsdale identified are now used routinely, and others intermittently to suit the 
context. The use of such varied methods potentially means that the VfM audit can access and 
use rich and deep data. However, it raises the potential for misunderstanding and confusion 
over the content and process of the audit (Byrne and Pierce 2007; Hopper, 1980; Keating and 
Jablonsky, 1991; Siegel, 2000). It also implies that auditors need to have a much greater 
range of knowledge and skills than previously used. 
Arnaboldi and Lapsley (2008) draw on Power (1997) to assess the perceptions of 
management in local government in Scotland, and how Best Value Audit (a version of the 
VfM audit) has impacted upon public sector organisations. They studied whether managers 
saw audit perceptions as a critical reference point in guiding their actions. They found strong 
evidence to support Power‟s views, in that respondents addressed the process of Best Value 
Audit as a tick-box exercise, rather than changing their behaviour as a result of the advice 
they received. Bowerman et al (2000) argue that the performance audit can be seen as just 
one element within a wide range of performance measurement and monitoring vehicles (e.g. 
self-assessment or inspection), which are being used by public sector managers and officials 
to improve accountability and performance. Morin (2001) notes that the auditors‟ style of 
leadership, their credibility in the eyes of the auditees and the connotations perceived by the 
auditees in the influence modes, and the use of statutory power by the auditors, are all factors 
that could enhance or hinder the effective performance of the VfM audit. 
Research on the VfM audit‟s effect on performance tends to have focussed on the views of 
the auditors and the audit bodies concerning the auditing process (Arnaboldi and Labsley, 
2008; Morin, 2008; Barrett, 2010; Funnel and Wade, 2012). The sparse literature on 
performance improvements shows that although the term VfM has become embedded in the 
day-to-day life of public organisations, its impact as a management tool for improvement 
performance cannot be taken for granted (Morin, 2001; Pollitt and Summa, 1997). 
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In the UK, the origins of audit work covering the assessment of economy and efficiency in 
public sector administration dates back to World War I and the post-war crises (Normanton, 
1966, p. 201). However, most of the key developments in this area took place during the 
1970s following a dramatic increase in public expenditure in the UK public sector (Glynn, 
1985; Pollitt, 1986; McSweeney, 1988; Heald, 2003; Pollock, Price & Player, 2007). The 
Conservative Government came to power with a manifesto to improve efficiency and 
minimise waste in public sector expenditure. To achieve these objectives, they introduced 
strict financial measures accompanied by enhanced scrutiny and introduction of expanded 
audit mandates at both central and local government levels. These were tasked with assessing 
(and thereby improving) the efficiency of the public services (Glynn, 1985). The early 1980s 
saw the extension of the VfM audit process to cover the 3Es. Specifically, it signified the 
beginning of a shift in interest from the measurement of input resources, such as money and 
staff, to a concern in measuring the output, that is, what such input was instrumental in 
achieving (Glynn, Perkins & Stewart, 1996). In 1983 the British government introduced VfM 
audits as part of statutory duties for the Audit Commission (AC). The AC was given the 
responsibility of undertaking VfM audits (carried out either in-house or sub-contracted to 
professional accounting firms in the private sector) of local government organisations, related 
bodies and operational branches of the National Health Service in England and Wales. In 
August 2010, however, the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government 
announced that the Commission was to be scrapped, with its functions being transferred to 
voluntary, not-for-profit or private sector accounting firms. The new plan enables the 
government to save £50 million annually, with the Commission‟s functions transferred to the 
local ombudsmen and private accounting firms. Legislation to abolish the Commission was 
included in the Local Audit and Accountability Act 2014, with a planned closure date of 1 
April 2015 (Audit Commission, 2014). 
The National Audit Office (NAO) was another body established under the terms of the 
National Audit Act of 1983 in order to carry out VfM audits in central government (Lapsley 
& Pong, 2000). The act approved the expansion of the auditor‟s role in the UK public sector 
as it granted the Comptroller and Auditor General remit to carry out “examinations into the 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which departments or other defined bodies have 
used their resources in discharging their functions, with the proviso that he/she must not 
question the merit of policy objectives” (House of Commons Library Research Division, 
1992: 34).Thus, the traditional focus of public sector audit on regularity has been overtaken 
by giving auditors responsibilities to investigate that proper arrangements are in place to 
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secure VfM in the use of public resources and to enhance the financial capability of public 
service organisations. These focus especially on cost-saving measures arising from changes 
in working patterns and practices. According to Politt (2003) the main reasons for the 
expansion in the external auditor‟s role was the recognition that auditors needed to take on 
multiple roles and assess multiple performance indicators; assessing performance in the 
public sector is difficult, as it cannot be judged by a single indicator or measure (Chowdhury, 
Innes and Kouhy, 2005; Audit Scotland, 2010; Talbot and Wiggan, 2010).  
The UK governmental ideology over the last two decades has placed further emphasis on the 
assessment of performance outcomes of public sector organisations and whether their 
resources are properly managed (Barrett, 2010; Micheli and Neely, 2010). This is evidenced 
by the statement by the Audit Commission (2010) that auditors are required to clearly 
determine in their reports if the audited bodies are properly positioned to satisfy the three 
parameters of performance: effectiveness (ability to manage spending and increase outputs); 
efficiency (ability to be productive); and economy (ability to minimise the service inputs). 
Consequently, VfM auditing emerged as powerful tool with which to reform public sector 
institutions (Lapsley and Pong, 2000; Power, 2000; Sharma, 2007; Gronlund, Svardsten and 
Ohman, 2011). The UK Government has adopted VfM audit as a tool to keep pressure on 
public organisations‟ management in order to achieve the maximum outcome from the public 
resources they are using, while simultaneously reducing public expenditure to the lowest 
possible level (Stewart and Walsh, 1992;Bowerman, Humphrey and Owen (2003). 
The continuous developments in VfM audit led to the expansion in external auditor‟s role as 
auditors are required to take on multiple roles, which were not perfectly reconcilable with one 
another (Politt, 2003). In the public sector it becomes even more difficult to assess 
performance or output as its performance cannot be judged by a single parameter 
(Chowdhury, Innes &Kouhy, 2005). Flesher and Zarzeski (2002) argue that the scope of 
public sector audit should go a step further than the standards and procedures that are 
applicable to audits of financial statements and involve other roles. Such roles should cover: 
(1) commenting on propriety, fairness and compliance of financial operations with laws and 
regulations; (2) determining whether the public organisations are managing their resources 
economically and efficiently; and (3) determining whether the desired results have been 
achieved, established objectives have been met and whether public organisations have 
considered the minimum cost alternatives, which might yield the desired results. 
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Given that: a) the VfM audit has begun to be used, not only as a means to carry out a 
financial audit, but as a powerful tool with which managers, politicians, regulators and 
consultants can reform public sector bodies in order to improve performance and 
accountability (Power, 1994); b) the similarity across private and public sectors of the audit‟s 
broad aim (McCrae and Vada, 1997 and Choudhury et al., 2005); and c) the literature still 
lacking empirical research on the practice of the VfM audit and its impact on the audited 
bodies (Glynn, 1985; Guthrie and Parker, 1999; Bowerman et al, 2000; Chowdhury et al., 
2005), there is a clear need for examining auditor and client expectations and perceptions of 
the performance of the VfM audit in public organisations. This is likely to help in identifying 
a potential perception performance gap between the two parties. 
All the study's participants, both auditors and clients, have been involved in the VfM audit for 
many years. The auditors enjoy high profile positions in their respective organisations (NAO, 
AC and private accounting firms) with extensive experience in VfM audits of public 
organisations. The majority of clients are also heads of financial and performance 
departments.   
Qualitative cluster analysis was used to examine the interview data. Based on this method 
themes emerging from the data were aggregated in line with the study's aims and objectives. 
In total four major areas could be identified in the data, which were also categorised based on 
the organisation type and role of the interviewee in the audit process (details about the 
interviews and data analysis procedures are provided in the research methodology and design 
section).  
Based on this analysis, we argue that different perceptions exist between auditors and 
auditees on the purpose and usefulness of the current VFM audit process and practice. 
Auditees consider receiving less value from the recommendations of auditors, which do not 
result in an improvement in audited bodies‟ performance. Specifically, the paper explores the 
expectations‟ gap between auditors and auditees and the factors contributing to the gap.  
 
3. Theoretical Framework of the Study  
 
Kahn et al (1964) and Katz and Kahn (1978) introduced role theory to explain how people in 
organisations enact their roles, and what influence those roles. Their theory models how 
individual characteristics and relationships affect the roles enacted by the focal person. These 
expectations are sent to the focal person by the role sender, or in some cases more than one 
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role sender. In this case the role senders are termed the role set (Merton, 1957). The theory 
says that the focal person behaves according to the expectations sent by the role set and that 
his or her interpretation of these expectations would influence the way that the role is 
enacted. Biddle (1979: 132) defines expectations as „subject held or emitted statements‟ by a 
person. These statements are reactions to specific object characteristics. Biddle differentiates 
expectations according to the person who holds or receives them, their initial source, nature 
or shape. The role played by the focal person as a result of his interpretation is referred to as 
received role; the interaction between the role set and focal role occupant is referred to as the 
role episode. 
Under role theory organisational characteristics such as its culture, structure or size, have 
direct influence on role sender(s) expectations of the focal role person (Lynch, 2007; 
Wickhamand Parker, 2007). Interpersonal factors such as the nature of the relationship 
between the role sender and the focal role person also affect the expectations of the role 
sender. The interpretations and behaviour of the focal role person is influenced by personal, 
organisational and relationship-related factors. The focal role person enacts the role(s) with 
the aim of managing a specific situation(s), both the situation and the person‟s behaviour 
being governed by context-specific rules. The term role is defined as a group of tasks that the 
focal role occupant accepts to carry out (Michael, 2001; Liu, Gould, Rollins and Gao, 2014). 
This role can be influenced by individual attitude, skills and competences and other 
interpersonal factors. It is the variations in expectations and the type of situation in which the 
role is enacted that sometimes results in role incompatibility between the role sender and the 
focal role person (Appah and Oyadongham, 2011).  
Failure to meet the expectations of the role sender results in what is called role conflict while 
the experiencing of uncertainty vis-à-vis expectations contributes to role ambiguity. Wolfe 
and Snoek (1962) and Van Sell, Brief and Schuler(1981) note that role conflict is the 
outcome of a number of pressures, which makes the focal person unable to comply with the 
role sender(s) expectations. Role conflict influences the successful completion of tasks, 
especially those that are linked to one another. Ambiguity instead is caused by the focal 
person‟s unawareness of what he is supposed to accomplish (Katz and Kahn, 1978): 
incomplete information makes the focal person unable to perform as expected by the role 
sender(s). This situation occurs when the focal person has a lack of understanding of the 
sender(s) expectations or when he does not know how to fulfil these expectations. 
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In the context of the VfM audit, there is increasing consensus among scholars that the VfM 
audit involves considerable interaction between auditors and auditees (Gendron, Cooper and 
Townley, 2007). Such interaction may take different forms such as persuasion, dissuasion, 
advice and warning (Morin, 2003). For this micro political process, a considerable degree of 
agreement over means, goals and ends has to be negotiated. Those working within a micro 
political traditional (see for example Power, 2000) have suggested that some of the apparent 
lack of success of VfM audits in improving organisational performance may be to do with a 
mismatch between the expectations and ambitions of the client and those of the auditor 
(Byrne and Pierce 2007; Hopper, 1980; Keating and Jablonsky, 1991; Siegel, 2000).  
As outlined in the literature review section VfM audit is created to achieve particular goals, 
such as improving accountability and performance through delivering VfM services. The 
expectations that underlie these mean that it is necessary to establish particular relationships 
between auditors and auditees (professionals and operational managers). The process of VfM 
audit also implies an interaction between the auditors and their clients that constitutes an 
attempt by the auditors to influence their clients both to make real change in the way they 
manage public resources and to improve performance (Morin, 2001). 
Auditors come to the VfM audit with expectations and preferences about what their clients 
should do or avoid doing to deliver VfM services. These auditors‟ expectations come mainly 
from the VfM audit regulatory bodies‟ guidelines (Sharma, 2007), but also from the auditors‟ 
own professional training and their experience in VfM audit (Lapsley and Pong, 2000; Funnel 
and Wade, 2012). Based on these expectations, VfM auditors undertake the audit and 
communicate their expectations to their clients in an attempt to influence the way in which 
taxpayers‟ money is managed. These communications normally take the form of 
recommendations that are intended for either complete or partial implementation by the 
auditors‟ clients.  
Clients also have expectations of the VfM auditors. These might be about the auditors‟ 
assessment of VfM factors (economy, efficiency and effectiveness), the ability to make a 
competent assessment, the practicality and relevance of their recommendations or the 
usefulness of the whole VfM audit process in improving performance in their institutions. 
Hence, it seems likely that the clients are not always passive recipients of auditor 
expectations. Instead, they might try to modify these expectations through a process of 
negotiation with their auditors to bring about conformity between the two parties‟ 
expectations (Stone-Romero, Stone and Salas, 2003). These processes of negotiation are 
more likely to narrow, or even eliminate, a potential audit expectations and perception gap 
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between the external VfM auditors and the auditees. These negotiation processes are 
influenced by the interplay of social factors at the personal (the VfM auditors‟ competence 
based on their relevant skills, experience and knowledge of the Public bodies‟ activities), 
interpersonal (task interdependence between the external VfM auditors and the auditees) and 
external levels (the ambiguity of the VfM audit process), in the VfM audit environment. 
Role conflicts, as mentioned above, form another element of role theory, which may also help 
in identifying potential role conflicts in the VfM audit environment. For the context of this 
study it has been conceptualised that both the VfM auditors and their clients have 
expectations and preferences in regard to one another. These expectations may have a 
significant impact on the VfM audit, since an audit expectations gap is likely to exist and give 
rise to role conflicts. Morin (2003) posits that controlling performance and improving it are 
two important objectives of the VfM auditors, but these objectives might conflict with each 
other. Morin argued that, if auditors involve themselves in helping the audited bodies to 
improve performance, this might risk their ability to maintain full and transparent control, or 
accountability, to the wider public. Morin also found that recommendations aiming to 
improve efficiency might prevent the achievement of effective objectives. For further 
literature on VfM and audit expectation gap please see Appendix I.  
According to the role theory the following types of conflicts might apply to VfM audit 
situations: (1) conflict between VfM auditors‟ roles and their own values and standards 
(person-role conflict); (2) conflict between the VfM auditors‟ capabilities and their role 
requirements (role-overload conflict); and (3) conflict between VfM auditors and auditees 
(inter-sender conflict). In this study each conflict is examined thoroughly within the 
framework of role theory. 
 
4.  Research Methodology and Design 
 
The assessment of VfM audit quality is a subjective one, due to the lack of standardised 
criteria of what makes for good practice, on both the auditor and client side, coupled with 
variations in perception of its usefulness on the part of the actors involved in the process. A 
qualitative, explanatory, study was therefore deemed appropriate since it allowed for the 
interpretation of participants‟ perceptions (Cassell and Symon, 1994). Semi-structured 
interviews of both auditors and auditees were chosen as the data collection method. The 
literature suggested a number of pertinent themes that needed to be covered in all the 
interviews (Drever, 1995). The core questions related to the interviewees‟ perceptions of the 
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practices and effectiveness of the VfM audit (see the Appendix II for details about the 
interview‟s questions plan). Other questions related to specific organisational contexts or to 
the role of the interviewee. 
The auditors that were interviewed included those working for the NAO and AC, as well as 
private accounting firms who were carrying out VfM audits in public sector bodies. Client 
interviewees represent four public organisations: (1) the National Health Service (NHS); (2) 
Local Government Authorities; (3) the Police Authority; and (4) Housing Associations. The 
breakdown of organisations approached in the first place is: 8 from NHS; 8 from Local 
government Authorities; 10 from the Police Authority; and 12 Housing Associations. 
Organisations that ultimately cooperated are: 6 from NHS; 5 from Local Government 
Authorities; 5 from the Police Authority; and 6 Housing Associations. Clients from central 
government were omitted because of access difficulty.  
A total of thirty-nine participants were interviewed. The auditor group comprised 17 
interviewees, all of whom had wide experience in the area of VfM audit, and had worked 
with a number of different public bodies. The client group comprised 22 interviewees, all of 
whom were in senior management positions. 
The selection of the client organisations was based on the desire to seek a diverse group of 
respondents. Diversity related to the professions working in the client organisations, and also 
the diversity of the services the organisations deliver to the public. This was considered 
important since VfM auditors may place more emphasis on efficiency in some organisations, 
and an emphasis on high quality in others, particularly when these services relate to public 
health or safety. Hence, VfM auditors‟ assessments may depend partly on the type of client 
they were interacting with, as well as the type of service provided. 
Another criterion used to select the client organisations was the length of time that they had 
been subject to VfM audit. The longer the time they had been involved in VfM audits, the 
better their likely understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the VfM auditors and the 
greater the extent to which these auditors would be able to fulfil their role satisfactorily. 
Experience is likely to influence the development of an audit expectations gap between VfM 
auditors and the auditees.  
The interviews were recorded and transcribed. The data were first grouped according to the 
main sectors involved, which enabled cross analysis between the various groups. During the 
process of categorisation, text was clustered in themes, then arranged and rearranged, and 
eventually a category could be defined. A total of four meta categories were formed. These 
were: a) participant expectations of the roles and responsibilities of the VfM auditors; b) 
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participants‟ perceptions of the performance of VfM audit; c) participants‟ perceptions of 
potential role conflicts; and d) participant perceptions of how social factors might affect the 
VfM audit‟s impact on audited bodies.  These four categories could be further sub-divided. 
For example category b) had several sub-categories including participants‟ perceptions of the 
VfM auditors‟ competence, the materiality of the VfM auditors‟ findings, the accuracy and 
fairness of their reports, and whether the process of VfM audit was perceived as a controlling 
or an improving process. Category c) was divided into three subcategories, conflict between 
VfM auditors‟ roles and their own values and standards, conflict between the VfM auditors‟ 
capabilities and their role requirements, and conflict between VfM auditors and clients‟ 
expectations of the other‟s role. These categories formed the basis for the results presented in 
the next section. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
In this section we discuss our interviewees‟ perceptions of the VfM auditors‟ roles and the 
VfM audit‟s ability to improve the performance of UK public sector organisations. We also 
examine the different role conflicts arising between auditors and auditees, both in terms of 
causes and consequences, based on the VfM audit practice. 
VfM auditors exercise roles which are intended to directly affect their clients‟ behaviour by 
identifying what they believe to be the strengths and weaknesses in the client‟s line of 
activities and in so doing help them to improve their performance. Our data show that both 
parties hold differing expectations of one another and different perceptions as to how 
effective the process is - there is a gap in both expectations and outcomes. Auditors have 
expectations of the clients in terms of the way they handle public resources and deliver 
services. Clients have expectations of the auditor‟s role and the usefulness of the VfM audit; 
auditors are expected to provide recommendations that their clients find valuable. If auditors 
do not fulfil these expectations, clients will ignore their recommendations and have little 
confidence in the auditor‟s findings.  
Hence, both parties should conform to the expectations of one another. If perceptions are 
congruent with each other then this might be considered as a positive indicator of the impact 
of VfM audit in improving the audited organisations‟ performance. However, when there is 
little or no consistency between the two parties‟ perceptions and expectations an audit 




Expectations of the VfM audit 
 
Interviewees were asked to give their views on the VfM audit process and its effectiveness. 
Our data indicate a consensus among the auditors on their roles in the VfM audit. Their 
responsibilities are to assess client performance through an evaluation of the 3Es, measuring 
these against a set of performance indicators provided by the public sector audit regulatory 
bodies. In their report‟s concluding remarks, they must say whether or not they are satisfied 
with the audited body‟s ability to deliver VfM outputs, such conclusions being based on 
congruence or disparity between the benchmarks and clients‟ actual practice. Areas for 
improvement must then be identified by the auditors, alongside recommendations to achieve 
such improvement. The auditors‟ pivotal role being that of expressing judgment, through 
their reports, about the adequacy of audited bodies‟ arrangements to secure economic, 
efficient and effective use of public resources. 
Porter (1993) classifies audit expectation gaps into two types, i.e. reasonableness gap and 
performance gap. He argues that reasonableness gap may exists if the auditors‟ clients have 
unreasonable expectations of the auditors‟ roles which differ from the roles defined by the 
law and professional promulgations and if the auditors themselves do not recognise that the 
expectations form part of their roles. While, performance gap could be defined as the gap 
between what society can reasonably expect the auditors to accomplish and what they are 
perceived to achieve (ibid: 50).   
Based on Porter‟s (1993) definition of audit expectations gaps, our data indicate no 
significant audit expectations gap between auditors and clients regarding their ability to 
assess the 3Es benchmarks. There was a general agreement between both parties about the 
auditors‟ ability to assess these factors. However, there was an expectations gap in terms of 
the recommendations made. Although VfM auditors agreed that they considered the extent to 
which they could provide clients with practical guidance to rectify a specific problem and 
improve performance, they also argued that they could not interfere directly in the client‟s 
method of tackling problems. Instead the auditors said they would encourage their clients 
either to consult another organization that had faced similar problems, or use information 
published by the regulatory body, such as the Audit Commission.  
Clients, on the other hand, expected their auditors to not only assess areas where performance 
could be improved, but also expected their VfM auditors to carry out a deep investigation and 
provide them with concrete suggestions about how to remedy problems and improve 
performance: what emerges is the existence of a „reasonableness‟ gap between auditors and 
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clients. This was particularly the case of respondents from the police authorities and housing 
associations. Part of this was frustration that the auditors were professionals with a wide 
perspective and practical experience of different organisations in the public sector and, yet, 
despite, this rich and extremely useful information, could not share good practice and bring 
some of their own learning into the organisation they were auditing. Without this, the audit 
risked becoming irrelevant.  
Auditors in contrast all said that client expectations of this were unreasonable, and insisted 
that undertaking such activities would compromise their independence and ability to work 
freely and objectively (Morin, 2003). Mindful of their official VfM audit remit (see section 
22, Code of Audit Practice, 2005) all interviewed auditors argued that their VfM audit role 
could and should not include providing their clients with what they deemed to be consultancy 
services: there was the potential for conflict between i) suggesting solutions and ii) assessing 
their implementation.  
 
Expectations concerning the outcomes of the VfM audit 
 
This section focuses on the application of the VfM audit and its ability to improve UK public 
sector performance. Three concepts (auditor competence, audit evidence, and performance 
audit) emerged as important from our data. 
 
VfM auditors’ competence  
The majority of auditors interviewed claimed that they were competent at undertaking the 
VfM audit and providing their clients with recommendations that would help them to 
improve performance. Those that did not claim to be competent appeared to be the result of 
differences between the VfM audit and financial or commercial audits (Power, 1997): 
competence in one type of audit was no guarantee that the auditor felt competent at 
undertaking any other type of audit. Consistent with Pendlebury and Shereim (1990), the 
National Audit Office (NAO) auditors judged themselves to be the most able to assess client 
performance, while auditors from the Audit Commissions and private accounting firms had 
slightly more reservations in this regard. The latter accepted that specialists and managers in 
the services department they were auditing were better able to judge their own organisation‟s 
performance. Whereas 85% of the auditors from private accounting firms said that they were 
competent to assess organizational economy and efficiency, only 46% were convinced that 
they were competent to assess effectiveness. The variation in responses between Audit 
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Commission and NAO participants is driven by the fact that the NAO is a big organisation 
with access to all Central Government departments and which chiefly examines, on behalf of 
Parliament, issues pertaining to public departments‟ expenditure of public resources and thus, 
their delivery of VfM services. The NAO also carries VfM studies on a national scale –much 
larger than the studies carried out by other audit bodies. 
However, although most of the auditors perceived that they were competent at undertaking a 
VfM audit, most of the client respondents emphatically took the opposite view. The main 
discrepancies occurred in relation to perceptions about a) the auditor‟s understanding of the 
nature of the client organisation‟s objectives and the services provided, and b) the auditor‟s 
ability to assess effective performance. Only 60% of the Police Authority and 33% of the 
NHS bodies perceived that the VfM auditors had relevant skills and experience, and a 
sufficient understanding of their operations. 
In light of these variations, our results suggest that unlike the private sector businesses where 
outcomes can be judged mainly on the sole criteria of „profitability‟, the outcomes of the 
public sector organisations need to address the social and emotional needs of the public. 
Economy and efficiency can be assessed on quantitative measures. To assess economy, 
auditors examine the cost of public resource acquisitions, while efficiency is assessed by 
comparing inputs with outputs (e.g. comparing the number of doctors in a hospital ward with 
the number of patients that have been treated in that ward). Effectiveness, however, is more 
difficult to assess, since auditors must consider output quality, as well as considering whether 
the audited bodies have achieved those objectives for which the public‟s funds have been 
used. All elements must be considered simultaneously in order to evaluate the audited bodies' 
delivery of VfM services. From this it may be assumed that auditors need particular skills, 
(e.g. skills to assess the quality of public services) as well as sufficient public sector 
experience to be able to balance these three elements in their assessment. Not only must 
auditors possess skills and expertise vastly, different from those needed to undertake a purely 
financially-based audit, they must also understand, to a considerable degree, the nature of 
public sector activities.   
Our analysis reveals that there are tangible and intangible values within the public sector 
profession. The tangible values are explicit and can thus be encapsulated and understood by 
the external auditors who are looking at things from a business point of view and base their 
judgments on „hard evidence‟.  However, there are also undeniable, intangible and implicit 
values which, being emotionally-related, are important to the public regardless of cost. These 
values, including the emotional interests of the patients, their need for care, and the public 
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need to feel safe, could never be captured by looking at hard evidence. The auditees argued 
that such values are far more difficult to be understood by auditors who are mainly trained as 
accountants to consider things from a purely financial viewpoint. They also add that this lack 
of understanding particularly in relation to intangible values will be reflected in auditor 
assessment of effectiveness.  
 
 
VfM Audit and Power Asymmetry  
Most of the auditees interviewed thought that the in-house auditors from the NAO and the 
Audit Commission had more relevant technical skills and knowledge of the public bodies‟ 
activities when compared to their counterparts from the private accounting firms, as they had 
worked as professionals in the public sector organisations prior to commencing their careers 
as VfM auditors. The external VfM auditors from private accounting firms, typically have 
obtained their knowledge through gaining accountancy qualifications and experience in 
financial audits. This knowledge however, was not perceived by the auditees to be sufficient 
to make them experts in VfM auditing. 
Consistent with Peiró and Meliá (2003), this knowledge power asymmetry, when combined 
with the intrinsic ambiguity of the client environment and the auditor‟s role, meant that in 
most cases external VfM auditors‟ performance was not seen to have reached a sufficient 
level of influence over the audited bodies to ensure that they adopted the auditors‟ 
recommendations. As a result, little real change in the way the audited bodies managed public 
resources was achieved. This view was shared by the auditors and auditees alike. 
It is relatively easy for auditors, when carrying out a financial audit, to challenge their clients 
if there is any misconduct in the financial statements. However, in the VfM audit, the audited 
bodies have to provide the external auditors with evidence about their conduct and reasons 
for any overspend in their departments. Subsequently, the external auditors must make a 
professionally-informed assessment of the evidence provided by the audited bodies, and 
make recommendations on how to improve their performance. Our data show that this is 
extremely difficult to do, and to establish facts or culpability when they have disputes with 
the auditees over the conduct of the VfM audit process. 
The VfM audit overload in the UK public sector (Pendlebury and Shreim, 1990), which also 
being identified in this study, intensifies the impact of interpersonal factors on the external 
VfM auditors‟ powers and their ability to influence their clients. Our data revealed that, 
because of this audit overload, the external VfM auditors do not have enough time to examine 
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each individual department in the audited bodies to identify precisely where problems lie. 
Thus the auditors can only make a general overview, based on the selected evidence provided 
by the auditees, of the audited body's VfM status. This general overview is insufficient to 
convince the auditees of the reliability of the auditor‟s findings and on the value to be added 
through the adoption of their recommendations. Thus, one of the most important determinants 
of the power of external VfM auditors over their clients is critically undermined. Given this 
context, the audit outcome would be improved if the audited bodies could identify those 
sections that are overspending or not achieving their objectives, and provide the auditors with 
reliable evidence with which to do a focussed piece of work on these specific departments. 
 
Role Conflicts 
Role conflict occurs when there is incompatibility or disagreement between an auditor‟s 
tasks, resources, rules or policies, and those of an organisation (Dale and Fox, 2008). Our 
data show that an audit expectations and perceptions gaps in the VfM audit environment gave 
rise to role conflicts. In total, three types of role conflict could be identified: role overload 
conflict, person-role-conflict and inter-sender conflict. 
First, conflict between the external VfM auditors‟ capabilities and their roles leads to role 
overload conflict. This had three main reasons: a) the auditees perceived that the auditors‟ 
have lack of competence to carry out the VfM audit and provide the clients with useful 
recommendations, b) the high volumes of VfM audit driven by the size of the organisation 
(i.e. audit overload) combined with limited clients‟ budgets allocated by the auditees for the 
audit process, and c) high levels of ambiguity associated with the VfM concept itself, due to 
the different possible  meanings of the term „Value for Money‟ and the inherent intangibility 
and ephemerality of public services.  
Second, role-overload results in a gap between the VfM audit requirements and external 
auditors‟ values and professional standards. This is a person-role-conflict, which occurs when 
the expectations associated with the auditor‟s moral or ethical self-concept are not met due to 
the incompatibility of professional inclinations and commitments to the audited bodies by the 
auditors (Asiri, 1998). The professional commitment of the auditors to their financial audit 
clients is to provide them with a good quality audit for the purpose of improving the 
credibility of their accounts in the eyes of the users of the financial statements (Baotham and 
Ussahawanitchakit, 2009). This commitment to the clients could be fulfilled by auditors in 
the course of carrying out their audit function via the process of preventing, detecting and 
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reporting any uncertainties to the relevant users (DeAngelo, 1981; Moizer, 1985; and Porter 
et al., 1996).  
A similar stance ought to be true in the case of the VfM audit, since the main aim of the 
auditors is to provide the audited bodies with a reasonable assessment of their performance 
and assure the government and the public, at large, of their proper conduct. Yet our interview 
data unveil that due to time constraints, budgetary limitations and lack of the auditors' 
competency, the ability of the external VfM auditors to make a good quality assessment and 
provide their clients with useful findings is a matter for concern. Auditors did not believe that 
they should be providing consultancy services, an important role identified by the auditees, as 
it conflicts with their professional stance (Assiri, 1998). 
The third gap, inter-sender conflict, which occurs when a role sender requires a role receiver 
to perform contradictory or inconsistent roles, emerged from the practical difficulties of 
determining the best practice in the VfM audit. Our findings suggest that these practical 
difficulties stem from the absence of standards upon which to draw evidence as to whether or 
not public services provide good value for money. These difficulties give rise to conflicting 
perspectives on the appropriate measures to use to assess areas for improvement. Attempting 
to apply standardised performance indicators by the external VfM auditors to the public 
sector bodies created inter-sender conflict as the auditors applied roles which have been set 
up by the regulatory bodies to be applied across public sector organisations, and which the 
clients did not accept were appropriate. These clients were also critical of the inflexibility of 
the process and the inability of the auditors to adapt standardised roles to the specific 
circumstances of their organisations. The auditee group suggested that they would normally 
use different ways of managing public resources to the ones that the auditors were familiar 




The data presented in this study indicate that both auditors and auditees perceive that the 
VfM audit is a potentially important tool with which to improve institutional performance in 
the public sector. But both groups indicate that the VfM audit is not yet as effective as it 
should be. Our interview data reveal clear differences in expectations and perceptions 
between the external auditors and their clients about the auditors‟ roles and the performance 
of the VfM audit. Clients expect the VfM auditors to identify areas where their performance 
needs to be improved, suggest solutions and then help to implement solutions. Our results, 
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consistent with Morin (2003), revealed that almost all the auditors perceived such client 
aspirations fell outside the remit of their role, and that such expectations could compromise 
their professional independence and objectivity. 
In addition, the study findings show that, while the majority of the auditors interviewed took an 
extremely positive view of their own achievements in terms of improving public institutions‟ 
performance and delivering VfM services, the majority of the clients, and some of the auditors, 
were not convinced of their competence to carry out the VfM audit effectively and provide 
appropriate recommendations. As a result, few auditees felt that there had been improvements in 
the way they managed public resources as a result of the auditors‟ efforts. Personal factors such 
as the VfM auditors‟ competence, skills, experience and knowledge of the public bodies‟ 
activities, interpersonal factors such as task interdependence and contextual factors such as the 
ambiguity of the VfM audit process, all had negative effects on the ability of the external VfM 
auditors to influence the audited bodies.  
Moreover, our results show that audit expectation and perception gaps between the external 
VfM auditors and their clients give rise to significant role conflicts. Three types of role conflicts 
have been identified; (a) conflict between the external VfM auditors‟ roles and their own 
professional values and standards (person-role conflict); (b) conflict between the external VfM 
auditors‟ actual capabilities and their role requirements (role overload), and (c) conflict between 
the external VfM auditors and their clients (inter-sender conflict). These three types of role 
conflict were compounded by the differences in expectations and perceptions between the 
external VfM auditors and their clients leading to lack of respect and antipathy for the auditor 
and the audit process. 
However, in contrast to Power (1994a), who was sceptical about the possible social benefit of 
investment in audit services and to Morin‟s (2003) study, which revealed that the role of 
controller for VfM auditors is more important than the role of improver, our auditees are 
convinced that there is a role for the VfM audit in improving performance. Respondents who 
supported VfM audit argued that, although the VfM audit did not, from an operational 
standpoint, make any special and visible contribution to public sector performance 
improvement, it was still able to make an invisible contribution to improved performance. 
The respondents are still in favour of investing in the VfM audit process, but with a continual 
review by the regulatory bodies. When asked about the VfM's contribution, a common 
response was that VfM has become more prominent and encouraged the audited bodies' 
management to see auditors‟ recommendations as a key part of their performance review. The 
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majority of client interviewees added that VfM audit has brought a considerable challenge 
and become embedded in their organisational overall objectives to the extent the 
organisation's members, particularly at the management level, started to think more widely 
about their strategies, their objectives and the available options for the delivery of VfM 
services. Interviewee comments indicate three main reasons for the VfM's potential in this 
regard. First, the VfM audit provides audited bodies with some assurance of efficient and 
effective conduct. Second, when auditors indicate areas for improvement, client action to 
remedy is triggered; it gives senior management explicit evidence of the whole organisation's 
performance; and since auditors have insight into other organisations' management and 
delivery of public services, they are likely to bring both an external, independent perspective, 
and considerable practical experience. Clients may thus assess their own performance in 
relation to other organisations. Third, respondents who were in favour of the VfM audit 
argued that in some organisations, particularly in the local government authorities where 
elections are usually held every year, it is common for these bodies to have short-term 
objectives which are likely to be politically motivated. Auditors have helped them to realise 
the importance of having medium and long term objectives. 
Our findings suggest that there is a pressing need for more studies to examine the factors that 
influence the effectiveness of the VfM audit. The views presented by auditors and auditees in 
this study have raised awareness of better methods to enhance cost-effectiveness and to 
improve the quality of services offered. The VfM audit‟s status as an appropriate tool initiates 
from the fact that an independent body‟s assessment of a public body‟s activities, is a good 
way to achieve best practice in the delivery of public services and transferability of examples 
of best practice across public bodies. However, our analysis also reveals that public sector 
organisations are continually changing their ways of managing public resources to improve 
the delivery of VfM services. Hence, in order for the VfM audit to be relevant and adequate 
in the face of such changes, its roles need to be reviewed and modified continuously. 
However, most clients argued that for auditors to demonstrate real commitment to improve 
the VfM audit's image in the eyes of the clients the auditors themselves need to improve in 
fulfilling the roles they are applying. Clients argued that auditors need to familiarise 
themselves more with the nature of the audited bodies‟ business and recognise the difference 
between assessing the performance in private sector organisation, where the main target is to 
get the most possible profit, and in public organisations where the main objectives are to 
deliver VfM services and improve public satisfaction. Thus further research could examine 
the skills needed by VfM auditors, the contingent needs of the different types of public 
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organisations, especially in view of the constant change which characterises the public sector 
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Appendix I: Key research papers on VfM and audit expectation gap including their 
aims, methods and main findings and interpretations. 
 
Author Name(s) Study Aim(s) Data and Methods Findings 
Funnel and 
Wade (2012) 
Examine auditors and 
auditees relationship 
in the context of 
performance audit in 
Australia 
Apply the five 
parameters typology of 
strategic reactions 




interviews and observe 
the auditors and auditees 
during the performance 
audit exercise  
Auditors and members of the Joint 
Committee of Public Accounts and 
Audit are positive and confident 
about the performance audit 
outcomes in terms of delivering value 
to the auditees. 
 
Auditees have shown resistance 
towards some of the performance 
audit outcomes as well as the attitude 
of auditors. 
 
The relationship between auditors 
and auditees is highly complex, 
particularly at the micro level of 
performance audit practice. 
Sharma (2007) Examine interactions 
among actors 
involved in the 
preparation of VfM 
audit reports 
Use field study at the 
National Audit Office. 
 
Apply dramaturgy 
metaphors developed by 
Goffman (1959) 
 
Informal interviews are 
conducted with teams 
preparing the audit 
reports. 
The actors are interacting and 
negotiating their position during the 
preparation of the VfM reports. 
 
Auditors use different set of language 
and texts with auditees and the 
members of the Public Accounts 
Committee in a manner that meets the 
expectations of each party. 
 
Auditors use facts to endorse their 




Investigate if there is 




(CAG) auditors and 
the users of CAG 
reports in 
Bangladesh. 
Use of questionnaire 
based on accountability 
theoretical framework. 
There are significant differences in 
perceptions between CAG auditors 
and the users in relation to auditor 
independence, competence, reporting 
and accountability, performance audit 




Examine the role of 
public audit bodies in 
the UK  
 
Review, discuss and 
debate key audit papers 
and documents and 
developments of the UK 
public audit practice. 
There is conflict over the scope of 
power and activities given to the UK 
four national audit agencies. 
There are number of limitations with 
the current public audit practice 
including consistency and less focus 
on outcomes. 
Morin (2003) Examine the role of 






approach covering six 
case studies of VFM 
audits. 
Data was collected 
through interviews and 
analysing of 
documentations. 
Auditors approach to VfM audit is 
influenced by the culture and the 
philosophical attitude of the 
organisation to whom they belong. 
VFM audit is not carried out in the 
form of vacuum but rather takes into 





Auditees are more inclined towards 
auditors‟ role as controllers than their 
role as catalysts. 
 
 
Morin (2001) Investigate indicators 
of performance and 
drivers of success in 
the VFM audit 
Use of multiple case 
study covering six cases 
of VFM audits in 
Canada.  
 
Conduct interviews and 
analyse documentations 
from the audit exercise. 
Auditees characteristics 
(commitment, tolerance and impact 
level) directly influence the audit 
process. 
 
There is lack of communication 
between auditors and auditees leading 
to weak influence by auditors and not 
achieving the desired outcomes. 
Lapsley and 
Pong (2000) 
Examine the practice 
of VfM audit in 
Scotland 
Apply Bourdieu (1977) 
reasoning of practice to 
VfM audit as perceived 
by auditors. 
 
Data was collected from 
auditors (elites) over two 
set of periods using 
specific set of questions 
and discussion. 
 
Auditors are positive in terms of the 
benefits attained from VfM audits at 
both operational and strategic levels 
of the audited organisations.  
 
The concept of VfM audit in practice 
is still not fully clear because of 
different interpretations of what 
constitute the best VfM audit among 
the auditors. 
 
VfM audit in its current practice does 
not fully capture the values of the 
audited organisations as some of 
them cannot be measured in 
monetary terms applied by auditors.   
Power (2000) Review the notion of 
„The Audit Society‟ 
asserted by Power 
(1999) and the case 
for „audit explosion‟ 
Use of critic and 
arguments on the causes 
and consequences of the 
audit explosion 
Audit has an economic and social 
dimension, which directly affect the 
way it is implemented. 
 
Different interpretations are still 
attached to various types of audit 
including VFM audit. 
 
Companies are less positive about the 
value added by auditors, particularly 
on the aspect of efficiency. 
 




and perceptions of 
each other 
Use relationship 
commitment theorem to 
test empirically the 
relationship between the 
audit firm and their 
clients 
Auditees consider limited variation 
existing in the service quality offered 
by different audit firms. 
 
Auditors and their clients consider 
their relationship as having mutual 
benefits to both parties. 
 
Affective commitment results in 
better communication and trust 
between auditors and their clients. 
Appendix II: The content of the interview 
The following issues were used as guidelines to set-up the interview questions: 
 The expectations of the VfM auditor‟s roles 
 Perception of the VfM audit‟s usefulness.  
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 Whether the VfM audit has been perceived as a process of controlling or a means to 
achieve performance improvement. 
 The impact of social factors at the personal, interpersonal and external levels on the 
effective performance of the VfM audit. 
 The materiality of the VfM auditors‟ findings. 
 The truth and fairness of the VfM auditors‟ reports. 
 Client acceptance of the auditor‟s recommendations. 
 The nature of role conflicts in the VfM audit environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
